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THE MARIANAS, THE UNITED STATES, AND THE
UNITED NATIONS: THE UNCERTAIN STATUS
OF THE NEW AMERICAN
COMMONWEALTH
I think the strategic importance of the Marianas to the Uni-




The "job" which Senator Goldwater seeks to expedite is the
creation of a commonwealth relationship between the Marianas
Islands2 and the United States by a covenant jointly proposed in
February, 1975,1 by the executives of the United States and the
Marianas. 4 The "strategic importance" of these islands to the
United States is clear. 5 However, the terms of the covenant and
1. 121 CONG. REc. 4083 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 1975).
2. The Marianas are an archipelago of fourteen islands lying some 100
miles to the north of Guam. Total land mass is 183.5 square miles, supporting
a population of about 15,000. 121 CONG. REC. 10796-97 (daily ed. June 17,
1975) (from Boorstin, United States May Acquire Micronesia, Daily Reporter
Herald, (Loveland, Colorado) June 13, 1975, at 4, col. 2, and Miller, New Pro-
gressive Outpost, The Progressive, June, 1975).
3. Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Is-
lands in Political Union with the United States of America, February 15, 1975,
H.J. Res. 549, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), S.J. Res. 107, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975 Covenant] [reproduced in 121 CONG. REe. 7106-
11 (daily ed. July 21, 1975)].
4. As of this writing the measure has been endorsed by a Marianan plebi-
scite, 121 CONG. REc. 111 (daily ed. July 21, 1975) (Senator Burton reporting
to the U.S. Senate), the United States House of Representatives, id. at 7117, and
the United States Senate, 122 CONG. RaE. 2256 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1976). The
bill was signed by President Ford on March 24, 1976. San Diego Union, Mar.
25, 1976, at A-7, col. 4.
5. The significant strategic commodities in the Marianas are land and pres-
ence. See Green, America's Strategic Trusteeship Dilemma Its Humanitarian Ob-
ligations, 9 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 19, 25 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Green]. The
1975 Covenant gives the United States the exclusive right to act as the Marianas'
agent in all areas of foreign affairs. 1975 Covenant, supra note 3, § 104. This
includes the exclusive right to maintain a strategic "presence" within the Marianas
Island District itself. The Covenant also provides for various lands to be leased
to the United States for military purposes. Id. art. VIII.
The need for military base locations in the Western Pacific is becoming
more critical as the United States finds itself virtually evicted from the Asian
1
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the manner of its implementation appear to be in direct conflict
with legal duties binding on the United States under international
law.
United States involvement with the Marianas began with the
islands' capture from the Japanese during World War II. In 1947,
the United States and the United Nations entered into a treaty6
establishing a trust relationship with the United States as trustee,
the island domain of Micronesia as the trust territory, and the
United Nations as the authorizing body. The Marianas and sur-
rounding waters comprise one of six districts of Micronesia which
make up this "Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands" (TTPI).
mainland. The Marianas, with Guam a mere hundred miles away, would
make an ideal location. A glance at the map demonstrates the strategically criti-
cal position of this archipelago. An arc of 1400 mile radius, centered in the
Marianas, sweeps through Japan, Taiwan, the Phillipines and New Guinea. If
the radius is extended to 2000 miles, the arc passes through South-Eastern Siberia,
Eastern China, the Southeast-Asian peninsula, Indonesia and the northern tip of
Australia.
The strategic defensive value of this extensive territory, lying as it
does along and across the lines of communication to Asia and the South
Pacific, has long been recognized. The fundamental relationship of the
territory to the future security of the United States became a matter of
grave concern to us when the aggressive intentions of Japan became in-
creasingly evident.
Statement by James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, Hearings on S.J. Res.
143 Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. at 14
(1947) [hereinafter cited as 1947 Hearings]. Note that Secretary Forrestal's re-
marks encompassed all of Micronesia, of which the Marianas Islands District is
the fraction most central to the Asian mainland, and for that reason probably
the most strategically located of the six districts which make up Micronesia.
The privilege of exclusive strategic presence in Micronesia provides two bene-
fitsfor the United States-first, the opportunity to maintain bases and forces; and
second and even more important, exclusive presence for the United States and the
correlative denial of military presence to others.
We have here islands that in many instances are nothing but sandspits.
They are of very little economic value. Our sole interest in them is se-
curity. But they are the spots on that great ocean surface that to-day
provide a capacity and an ability for a nation that would seek to conduct
aggressive operations across that ocean. They would have to use them.
So long as we have them, they can't use them, and that means to me,
even in their negative denial to someone else, a tremendous step forward
in the security of this country.
Statement of General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, id. at
18. Here again the reference is to' all of Micronesia. There is indication that
the People's Republic of China is favorably disposed towards the stabilizing effect
of a continued United States presence in the Western Pacific. See Green, supra,
at 24.
6. Trusteeship Agreement for the Former Japanese Mandated Islands, July




Bergsman: The Marianas, The United States, and the United Nations: The Unce
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1976
THE NEW AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH
The 1975 Covenant is an attempt by the United States to ter-
minate the trust relationship which exists between itself and the
Marianas. This comment will examine the legal sufficiency of the
Covenant to accomplish that end.
The 1947 Agreement does not include a clear statement of
the trustee's legal duties regarding trust termination. However,
it does require the trustee, or "Administering Authority", to pro-
mote both international security, and the political and other
humanitarian interests of the territory's inhabitants. The United
States has consistently emphasized the security aspects of these
obligations. Moreover, the United States has failed to distinguish
between global security interests and its own. Consistent with
this position, the United States has understood trusteeship to be
roughly equivalent to annexation, and termination to be a matter
of unilateral discretion. 7 On the other hand, the United Nations'
interpretation of these duties is strongly oriented toward the
humanitarian needs of the inhabitants, and its position on trust
termination diverges widely from that held by the United States.
The promotion of the 1975 Covenant by the United States
is an international event which clearly favors the strategic interests
of the Administering Authority over the humanitarian interests of
the trust territory's inhabitants. The United States has not made
even a modest effort to comply with the criteria established by
the United Nations for proper trust termination. Under inter-
national law, this collision of priorities must be resolved against
the United States. The United Nations cannot, consistent with its
expressed position, endorse the 1975 Covenant as an example of
proper trust termination. Should the United States persist after
disapproval by the United Nations in promoting a new Marianan
status strongly advantageous to the United States, such an act could
only be interpreted as an act of colonialism. 8
7. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there any authority in the United Na-
tions to compel us to do more than we determine we should do?
Mr. GERm. [Chief, Division of Dependent Area Affairs, Depart-
ment of State] No; none whatever.
1947 Hearings, supra note 5, at 22.
8. "Colonialism" is used here in an everyday, nontechnical sense. For ex-
ample, it may be defined as: "[a] policy by which a nation maintains or extends
its control over foreign dependencies." Tm AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 262 (1969).
1976
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I. THE EVOLVING DUTIES OF TRUSTEESHIP
The central question in determining whether the United
States has complied with the duties set forth in the 1947 Agree-
ment is whether that Agreement extends to the United States an
absolute right to determine and pursue its security interests in the
TTPI. An affirmative finding would authorize any action the
United States might regard as appropriate, including implementa-
tion of the 1975 Covenant. But if it appears that development
of the inhabitants' humanitarian needs was anticipated by the
Agreement to be the interest of highest priority, then the 1975
Covenant must comply with those ends, or else be regarded as
a violation of the 1947 Agreement. An examination of the nego-
tiations leading to the signing of the Agreement, and both early
and recent interpretations of the United Nations Charter, compels
the conclusion that, in this instance, the humanitarian interests
should prevail.
A. Early Compromises
The United States is in the peculiar position of having stood
on both sides of this controversy at different times. In 1941,
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill met to discuss
the principles which should underlie any future reconstruction of
the world order at the war's end. In the Atlantic Charter' which
issued from that meeting, the United States rejected the notion
of territorial expansion through annexation of conquered lands.
This expression of liberal humanitarianism was the seed for a future
trusteeship system geared to the best interests of dependent in-
habitants in the trust territories.
A year later,10 the United States' view of the dominant prob-
lem attending post-war non-self-governing territories had switched
from a concern for the inhabitants' development toward self-deter-
mination, to a realization of how vital to world peace and Ameri-
can security the skillful management of a territory such as
Micronesia would be." This shift of policy precipitated a conflict
9. Joint Declaration of August 14th, 1941, 55 Stat. 1600 (1941), E.A.S.
No. 236.
10. The United States was brought into the war by the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. This was half a year after publication of the
Atlantic Charter, and heralded a gradual reassessment of the American champion-
ship of Wilsonian liberal humanitarianism expressed in that declaration.
11. Sacrifices exacted of the nation by the continuing global struggle
displaced an evanescant liberal humanitarianism, opening a new chapter
Vol. 6
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between humanitarian considerations and strategic interests which
would play a key role in deliberations when the victors of World
War II convened to establish the principles by which the new
world organization, the United Nations, would be guided.
At the drafting of the United Nations Charter in 1945,12 the
United States urged that provision be made for two types of trust
territories. One would hold paramount the interests of the inhabi-
tants, while the other would regard security considerations as
controlling. The British, still champions of the liberal humanitar-
ianism expressed in the Atlantic Charter, objected."' A compro-
mise was struck,14 leading to a proposal which would establish the
International Trusteeship System.
The proposed chapter provided for "strategic areas" within
trusts, 15 a provision which apparently satisfied the United States'
in trusteeship policy-preparation. Sometime during the spring of 1944,
the question of future Pacific military bases occupied the President's
thinking.
Green, supra note 5, at 28. As early as July, 1942, President Roosevelt had de-
cided that "the instrumentality of trusteeship should safeguard international peace
and security, rather than the sole promotion of self-government or independence."
Id. For a discussion of Western Pacific security issues, see note 5, supra.
12. The Charter was drafted at the United Nations Conference on Interna-
tional Organization, San Francisco, 1945.
13. Territorial Trusteeship: United Kingdom Draft of Chapter for Inclusion
in United Nations Charter, U.N. Doc. 2-G/26(d), 3 U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 609 et seq.
(1945).
14. One writer states that:
To meet British concerns for the territorial inhabitants' welfare, the
United States Delegation revised its proposals to apply the system's basic
objectives specifically to peoples of strategic areas.
Green, supra note 5, at 32 (footnote omitted).
15. The duties of trusteeship are described in chapters XI and XII of the
U.N. Charter. Chapter XI applies to all "non-self-governing" territories, of which
trust territories are an example, and stipulates that any member State which has
or assumes administrative responsibilities for a dependent State, accepts its respon-
sibilities as a "sacred trust", recognizing that the interests of the inhabitants are
paramount. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
Within the requirements set forth in chapter XI, chapter XII describes the
additional duties of trust administration. A trusteeship is established by agree-
ment between the United Nations and an Administering Authority, which agrees
to promote the basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System, which in-
clude world peace, and the well-being of the dependent population. U.N.
CHARTER arts. 76-81.
Within this general framework of trusteeship, chapter XII also provides for
the designation of any area within a trust as a "strategic area". The Security
Council speaks for the United Nations on all matters relating to such areas. For
all other areas, the General Assembly has this authority. No further details are
given concerning the distinction between strategic and non-strategic areas, this
6
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security requirements.' However, if the United States understood
this to be a blueprint for trust agreements under which security
interests might predominate to the exclusion of the humanitarian,
such a view was not supported by the initial reaction to the pro-
posed chapter. When the drafting committee' 7 for this proposal
reported back to its governing commission,"' the debate which fol-
lowed included praise, 19 criticism,20 reassurance 21 and even the
function being relegated, apparently, to the particular trusteeship agreement. U.N.
CHARTER arts. 82-85.
Of the eleven trusteeships established under the U.N. Charter, the only area
designated as strategic was the entirety of the TTPI.
16. The Agreement which the United States concluded under the terms of
that Chapter certainly seemed satisfactory to the U.S. military:
In accepting the islands in strategic trusteeship under the United Na-
tions, the United States can proceed to make permanent provision for
the administration of these islands and their inhabitants more rapidly
and under more favorable political conditions than would otherwise be
possible.
Statement of Robert P. Patterson, Secretary of War, 1947 Hearings, supra note 5,
at 11.
17. Committee 11/4 (Conference Technical Committee on Trusteeship), of
the United Nations Conference on International Organization.
18. Commission 11, of the United Nations Conference on International Or-
ganization.
19. [A]nd when in . . . this Declaration, they enlarge upon the nature
of this pledge of acceptance, and in the simplest of terms promise not
only to develop self-government, but also "to take due account of the
political aspirations of the people," and, what is more important, "to as-
sist them in the progressive development of their free political institu-
tions," there is no possible way to underestimate the importance of this
pledge. There can be no possible misunderstanding. The humblest,
most bewildered human being must know what these words hold out to
him. Here is the promise of independence; here is the pledge of his
freedom.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 689 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Charter Debates].
(General Romulo, representative of the Philippines, commenting on the text which
subsequently became article 73 of the Charter.)
20. I remember a word said by Commander Stassen [the U.S. Represen-
tative to the drafting committee] in the Committee, that this document
is a living document and like all living beings, I wish to comment, it
must evolve, it must change, and it must grow into something greater
and better. This is the reason why, even though the Egyptian Delega-
tion does not look upon this document as in any way an ideal document,
nevertheless it considers that it presents a great step forward, and in the
right direction, and we hope that it opens for the peoples under trustee-
ship a brighter and happier future than what they have experienced in
the past, and that it will help in bringing many of them to the goal of
complete independence at the earliest possible moment.
Comments of Mr. Awad, representative of Egypt, id. at 697.
21. But whatever difficulties are there, the rule that we will be guided
by-I know I speak for my own country, but I feel I speak also for every
country in a similar position-is that we have accepted a mandate as
a sacred trust, not as part of our sovereign territory. The mandate does
Vol. 6
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prescient observation that no express provision had been made for
trust termination.2" However, the central concern of these com-
ments was the proposal's adequacy in promoting the interests of
a dependent territory's inhabitants. The draft text was adopted
without objection 23 and subsequently became Chapter XII of the
United Nations Charter.24
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system are set out in
article 76 of the United Nations Charter. The first two of these
embody conflicting views regarding the primary purpose of
trusteeship. Article 76(a) favors the strategic interests:
[T]o further international peace and security.
and article 76(b) champions the humanitarian needs of the in-
habitants:
[T]o promote the political, economic, social, and educational
advancement of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and
their progressive development towards self-government or in-
dependence as may be appropriate to the particular circum-
stances of each territory and its peoples and the freely
expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as may be
provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement ....
There is specific language binding the Administering Authority
of strategic areas to observe both of these principles. 25  However,
there is no provision in the Charter which explains how conflicts
between their applications should be resolved.
Within the context of these Charter provisions, the TPPI was
established in 1947 as a strategic area trusteeship by agreement
between the United Nations Security Council and the United
States government. 26  This Agreement commands that the Ad-
ministering Authority shall "act in accordance with the Charter of
not belong to my country or any other country. It is held in trust for
the world.
Comments of Mr. Frazer, representative of New Zealand, id. at 701.
22. [T]here is no specific regulation in the Charter as to how to termi-
nate a trusteeship. A territory under trusteeship has no specific way of
applying for independence and being granted that independence. It is
at the mercy of the trustee power. Had provision been made for that,
the Charter would have been better.
Comments of Mr. Al-Jamali, representative of Iraq, id. at 685.
23. Id. at 702.
24. U.N. CHARTER chap. XII.
25. "The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the
people of each strategic area." U.N. CI-IAR R art. 83, para. 2.
26. 1947 Agreement, supra note 6.
1976
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the United Nations. 27 Concern for the welfare of the inhabitants
persists in the 1947 Agreement in language substantially similar
to that of Article 76(b).28  The significance of the strategic
designation of the area is reflected in the right of the Administer-
ing Authority to "establish naval, military and air bases"' 29 and to
close parts of the territory from time to time "for security
reasons."
30
The debates in the Security Council over the terms of the
1947 Agreement opened with token United States acknowledge-
ment of the Atlantic Charter."' However, this did not diminish
United States determination that, in this instance, "these islands
[consituted] an integrated strategic physical complex vital to the
security of the United States, 32 and that "in such an area the secur-
ity objective must be an overriding consideration. '"" While there
was general agreement that international security favored the
trust, 4 the rigid demand by the United States for virtually
27. Id., art. 4. Since the U.N. Charter is incorporated by reference into the
1947 Agreement, the United States' obligation to observe the Charter stems in this
instance not only from membership in the world body, but also from treaty obliga-
tion.
28. [The Administering Authority] shall promote the development of
the inhabitants of the Trust Territory towards self-government or inde-
pendence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of the
Trust Territory and its peoples and the freely expressed wishes of the
peoples concerned ....
Id., art. 6, para. 1.
29. Id., art. 5, para. 1.
30. Id., art. 13.
31. The United States, like other nations adhering to the United
Nations Declaration of 1 January 1942, subscribed to the Atlantic
Charter Principle that they would "seek no aggrandizement, territorial
or otherwise."
U.N. SCOR 407 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Trusteeship Debates] (remarks of
Mr. Austin, U.S. representative to the Security Council, upon the presentation of
the U.S. draft proposal).
32. Id. at 409.
33. Id. at 664.
34. For example, in the words of Mr. Quo Tai-chi, representative of China:
"I am confident that those strategic islands under United States' administration
will constitute a great bulwark of peace and security in the Pacific." Id. at 467.
Mr. Gromyko, speaking for the Soviet Union, also endorsed the Trusteeship,
but for the almost sinister reason that "the United States made incomparably
greater sacrifices than other Allied Powers [in the conquest of Micronesia] .. "
Id. at 415. Such a reason for post-war occupation would be in plain conflict with
the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. Perhaps this was an expression of indirect jus-
tification for then-current Soviet expansion plans, or perhaps an expression of
skepticism of the expressed altruism of American motives for occupation. The
U.S. representative had brought up the trust-context irrelevant truth that "[t]ens
Vol. 6
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autonomous control was met with uneasiness. Minor amend-
ment"3 to the United States' proposed draft which sharpened the
distinction between trusteeship and annexation was grudgingly
accepted,36 and one delegate reminded the Council that all trusts
anticipate eventual termination.
3 7
Fiery debate followed a Soviet suggestion that the unilateral
power to terminate trusteeship be vested in the Security Council."
The United States demanded that its consent be required for any
alteration of the terms of the trusteeship agreement.3 9 When the
United States ambassador threatened to scuttle the agreement
rather than permit even modest alteration of the American
provision, 40 the United States proposal was adopted virtually
of thousands of American lives, vast expenditure and years and bitter fighting
were needed to drive the Japanese aggressors from these islands." Id. at 409.
35. One Soviet amendment deleted words which would characterize the trust
territory "as an integral part of the United States" from a sentence explaining how
U.S. law would apply to the trust territory. Another amendment included "inde-
pendence" as an express political possibility for the islanders. Id. at 415.
36. In regard to the "independence" amendment, Mr. Austin said: "[Tlhe
United States feels that it must record its opposition . .. to the idea that in this
case independence could possibly be achieved in the foreseeable future." Id. at
474.
37. [T]he Charter does include provisions for the termination of a
Mandate [i.e. "trusteeship"; the Ambassador is using the old League of
Nations terminology. "Mandates" are unknown to the U.N. Charter].
The Charter does not provide for Trusteeships being eternal. It says that
Trusteeships will be ended by self-government or independence.
Id. at 678 (comments of Mr. EI-Khouri, representative of Syria, in response to
the question "What does the Charter say about termination?" asked by Mr. Cado-
gan, representative of the United Kingdom. Id. at 676).
38. The U.S. wording of article 15 of the proposed draft was: "[t]he terms
of the present Agreement shall not be altered, amended or terminated without the
consent of the Administering Authority." 1947 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 15.
The Soviet proposed version read: "[t]he terms of the present Agreement may
be altered, supplemented or terminated by decision of the Security Council."
Trusteeship Debates, supra note 31, at 415.
39. Mr. Austin explained:
As a matter of principle, therefore, [this amendment] ought not to be
accepted since the whole theory of the Trusteeship System is based on
the fact that there must be, in any case, at least two parties to any trus-
teeship agreement.
Id. at 670.
40. At one point in the debate Mr. Quo Tai-chi, representative of China,
proposed the following wording as a possible compromise to resolve the dispute:
"The terms of the present Agreement may be altered or amended in accordance
with the provisions of the Charter." Mr. Quo then inquired as to whether this
language might meet with U.S. approval. "No; definitely not." snapped Mr. Aus-
tin. Id. at 675.
In response to the original Soviet proposal, the American representative had
warned: "[the]. . . amendment. . . proposed by the representative of the Soviet
1976
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intact. 1
Any restraint which the United States had exercised during
the Security Council debates, in promoting the position that this
trusteeship was not distinguishable from annexation because it had
been classified as "strategic", had disappeared by the time the 1947
Agreement was submitted to the United States Congress for ap-
proval. The principles of the Atlantic Charter abandoned,42 effu-
sive representatives of the executive43 and the military4 4 explained
to an eager Senate 45 that United States' rights in the TTPI would
Union would probably be unacceptable to the United States as a party to the
agreement." Id. at 670.
41. The debate drew to a close with Mr. EI-Khouri indicating surprise at
the United States' inability to accept wording which bound them to an observance
of the Charter, but then joining his colleagues in the defeat of the Soviet amend-
ment, and immediately thereafter, the unanimous approval of the agreement as
a whole. Id. at 679.
42. Even at this early stage, there was a firm appreciation that this trustee-
ship was likely to be a long-term one, with the length of the term determined
by the interests of the Administering Authority.
The fundamental relationship of the territory to the future security of
the United States became a matter of grave concern to us when the ag-
gressive intentions of Japan became increasingly evident ...
We believe that the relationship of the Territory of the Pacific Is-
lands to our own security will assume a far more vital character in the
future.
Statement of J. Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, 1947 Hearings, supra note 5,
at 14. Robert Patterson, Secretary of War commented: "In accepting the islands
in strategic trusteeship under the United Nations, the United States can proceed
to make permanent provision for the administration of these islands ....... Id.
at 11.
43. Secretary Patterson left little question as to the position of the American
Government:
There has been no doubt within these executive agencies of the Govern-
ment having primary responsibility for the national security that these
islands must be held under an arrangement which assures their exclusive
control by the United States.
Id. at 11.
44. Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower pointed out that:
It seems ...there are only two questions to be considered. First,
Is this area necessary to the security of the United States? Secondly,
Does the agreement under which we obtained it from the United Nations
give us all the national security rights and, you might say, permissive
functions that we need? In both cases I think the answer is, "Yes."
Id. at 18.
45. The exclusive concern of the senators at this hearing was that the 1947
Agreement not abridge the rights of conquest, currently enjoyed by the U.S. At
one point the committee chairman, seeking reassurance of this, asked the Secre-
tary of State:
So that you would say, as I understand you, that under the terms of the
trusteeship agreement we have the same freedom of action on behalf of
national security as we would have if we were continuing the administra-
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be virtually absolute4" and certainly unhampered by the humani-
tarian duties of trusteeship.
4 7
The United States' commitment to the primacy of promoting
peace and security had been made clear. The United Nations'
had set forth its position more gently, but with sufficient convic-
tion to establish a basic conflict between the principles expressed
by articles 76(a) and 76(b) of the Charter. This controversy lay
dormant for a decade and a half before being propelled into visi-
bility by a confrontation which did not directly involve the United
States.
B. A Firm United Nations Position: The
Priority of Proper Termination
Nikita S. Khrushchev, in an address to the General Assembly
in September, 1960, proposed adoption of a declaration which
called for the "final elimination of the colonial regime in all its
forms and manifestations, . . immediately and uncondition-
ally!"' 48  Sponsorship of the resolution was assumed by a group
of forty-three African and Asian States49 and on December 14,
1960, the celebrated 5° Declaration on the Granting of Independ-
46. Secretary of State Marshall understood that the 1947 Agreement would
in no way impede the security interests of the United States:
Mr. Chairman, I think the terms of the agreement have been so carefully
drafted from the security point of view that there is no doubt in my mind
that our security and our responsibility for general security are fully pro-
vided for. . . . I believe all our interests are fully conserved.
id. at 5.
47. The question of the inhabitants' interests came up occasionally, only to
be dismissed as irrelevant. For example:
Senator CONALLY. . . . [Is there anything in here about the
rights of the inhabitants, the natives, that would in any wise hamper us
in our defense control?
Secretary MARSHALL. I do not think there is, sir.
Id. at 6. Or again:
The CHAIRMAN. Is there anything in any of these obligations which
you have recited which impinges in any way upon our autonomy with
respect to national security?
Mr. GERIG. [Chief, Division of Dependent Area Affairs, Depart-
ment of State]. Not in the slightest degree.
Id. at 21.
48. U.N. Doe. A/4502 at 13 (1960).
49. U.N. Doc. A/L.323 Add. 1-6 (1960). For a list of the forty-three
states, see Y.B. oF THE U.N. 49 (1960). This sponsorship was so rigidly partisan
that even the U.S.S.R. was barred from participation.
50. [This declaration] is the most frequently cited resolution in the
United Nations. Most of the African and Asian nations regard it as
a document only slightly less sacred than the charter and as stating the
law in relation to all colonial situations.
1976
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ence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was passed by the over-
whelming vote of 89-0, with nine abstentions. 1 This declaration
is, by its simplest interpretation, a statement that colonialism, in
any form, is illegal per se;52 trusteeship is listed as one of the
forms.53
If this Declaration commanded that trusteeship must
terminate, the question of how was answered the very next day
with the passage of Resolution 154 1, 54 a statement of criteria for
Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J. INT'L L 713, 730 (1971) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Rosenstock].
51. G.A. Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, Annexes, Agenda
Item No. 87, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter cited as 1960 Declara-
tion].
52. Several writers conclude that this is the overriding message of the 1960
Declaration. For a discussion, and a thorough gathering of authority, see Green,
supra note 5, at 43-49.
53. "Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust . . . Territories ... to enable
[the inhabitants] to enjoy complete independence and freedom." 1960 Declara-
tion, supra note 51, para. 5.
54. G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 29, Annexes, Agenda Item
No. 38, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Resolution 1541].
Ironically, the two resolutions originated quite independently of one another, and
the simultaneity of their passage appears entirely coincidental.
Under chapter XI of the U.N. Charter, all administering nations are required
to account to the U.N. with respect to the evolution of their dependencies. If
the dependent territory is a trusteeship, the nature of the administrator's duty will
be set forth in the trust agreement. If the dependency is not a trust territory
(a colony, for example) the duty of the administering nation is set forth in article
73(e) of chapter XI: "to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General [statistical
information] ... "
A committee was established in 1959, G.A. Res. 1467, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp.
36, at 36, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 36 at 126, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959), to
determine those principles which should guide the world body in deciding when
the obligation to transmit information under article 73(e) ceases. Resolution
1541, the committee's work product, is the statement of those principles. The im-
mediate incentive had been the recent failure of Portugal to transmit information
concerning its colonies. Resolution 1541 was put to immediate work in G.A. Res.
1542, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 30, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 38, at 9, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1960), requiring such transmission.
Article 73 defines a dependent territory as one whose peoples have not yet
attained a "full measure of self-government." The committee understood its task
to be the construction of this phrase, for when a territory achieved a full measure
of self-government, the duty of its one-time administrator to transmit information
would end. In its larger sense, then, Resolution 1541 may be regarded as estab-
lishing the procedure which must be followed if a territory is to pass from a de-
pendent to a self-governing status. As a side-effect of defining the appropriate
procedure, the Resolution also provides definitions of the intended initial and final
conditions of the subject matter on which that procedure operates. Regarding the
subject matter of the Resolution as a territory's political status, the initial condi-
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determining when an administering nation's obligations to account
to the United Nations regarding a dependent territory ceases.
This Resolution indicates that the processes of dependency ter-
mination and correct territorial administration cannot be sepa-
rated. It states that the administering nation has the duty to
promote:
[A] dynamic state of evolution and progress towards a "full
measure of self-government". As soon as a territory and
its peoples attain a full measure of self-government, the obli-
gation [of the administering nation to account to the United
Nations with regard to the territory] ceases.55
The Resolution explains that:
[A] Non-Self-Governing Territory can be said to have reached
a full measure of self-government by:
(a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State;
(b) Free association with an independent State; or
(c) Integration with an independent State.56
Neither the 1960 Declaration nor Resolution 1541 provides
for any exception based on security interests. Both are under-
stood to be constructions of the United Nations Charter,17 an
instrument which the United States is bound to observe under the
terms of the 1947 Agreement." Together, these resolutions
establish the firm United Nations position that the TTPI must be
terminated, and terminated properly. 59
tion is "dependence" (or technical colonialism perhaps) and the final condition
"self-governance". While the Administering Authorities of trusteeships are not
held to the terms of article 73(e), they are bound to promote self-government,
and success in this regard would terminate the trust. See note 37, supra. The
criteria established by Resolution 1541, for determining how and when a "full-
measure of self-government" is achieved, are thus entirely relevant to a discussion
of the criteria for correct trusteeship termination.
55. Resolution 1541, supra note 54, Prin. II.
56. Id., Prin. VI.
57. The very purpose of Resolution 1541 was the construction of parts of
chapter XI of the Charter. See note 54, supra. The 1960 Declaration opens:
1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and ex-
ploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, [and] is
contrary to the Charter of the United Nations ....
1960 Declaration, supra note 51.
58. See note 27, supra, and accompanying text.
59. The debate on the status of General Assembly resolutions as statements
of international law has persisted without abatement since the founding of the
U.N. The Charter's terse treatment of the subject is not dispositive. Article 13
simply authorizes the General Assembly to "initiate studies and make recommen-
dations for the purpose of ... encouraging the progressive development of inter-
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II. THE 1975 COVENANT
Scrutiny of the 1975 Covenant, 60 the way in which it evolved,
and the manner in which it is intended to be implemented reveals
two major discrepancies between the actions of the United States
and the obligations of trust termination. First, the United Nations
has been excluded from participation in this termination process,
in direct contradiction to the requirements of the United Nations
national law and its codification." The bulk of current legal opinion regarding
the weight which should attach to General Assembly resolutions lies between the
extremes of "recommendatory only" and "law-making per se." Emerson explains:
No one is likely to deny that principles laid down by the United Na-
tions may under appropriate conditions set in motion forces which ulti-
mately have the effect of bringing law into being, nor, on the other side,
does anyone assert that Assembly resolutions laying down general princi-
ples automatically create international law.
Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 460 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Emerson].
The prevailing legal approach avoids simple rules, and seeks to take into ac-
count the particular circumstances of each resolution. Certain factors enjoy wide
acceptance as contributing to the legal force of a particular resolution: (1) the
degree to which the resolution purports to be declaratory of existing law, espe-
cially the U.N. Charter, rather than prescriptive of new law; (2) the degree of
consensus at the time of the resolution's acceptance; (3) its longevity, measured
for example, by the frequency of recitation and general support as law in the inter-
national community; (4) the voting position taken by the member sought to be
bound. In this regard, "[a]bstention by a state is treated without injustice as
acquiescence in obligations specified on the basis that any real demurrer could
have been equally expressed." Green, supra note 5, at 47.
Several of these factors were drawn together in the following comment, made
by the United States representative during the drafting of The Declaration of Prin-
ciples Concerning Friendly Relations:
The significance of this gradual accumulation of areas of agreement can
best be understood in light of the nature of the operation in which we
are involved. For some years the Assembly has been engaged in formu-
lating legal texts which will be authoritative interpretations of broad
principles of international law expressed in the Charter. By the very
nature of General Assembly action, the juridical value of such texts is
directly dependent on the general support that they command. Obvi-
ously formulations representing the general agreement of the Member-
ship of the United Nations have important juridical value. A formula-
tion merely setting forth various highly controversial majority views, by
contrast, is totally ineffectual as a declaration of international law. It
is legally significant only as evidence of the extent of divergence of opin-
ion within the international community.
Rosenstock, supra note 50, at 714 n.4.
Measured in terms of these factors, the 1960 Declaration has achieved the
highest degree of acceptance in the U.N.'s history. See note 50, supra. Taking
into account its narrower subject matter, the less celebrated Resolution 1541 is
also in a firm legal position as authoritative construction of the Charter. For
a brief overview of these matters, and an excellent gathering of authority, see
Green, supra, note 5, at 43-48.
60. 1975 Covenant, supra note 3.
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Charter.61 Moreover, it is not clear that the United States has
the authority to negotiate termination with a part of the trust terri-
tory, to the exclusion of the rest. Second, neither of the primary
criteria for proper trust termination has been met in the 1975
Covenant and the commonwealth which it seeks to establish.
A. The Evolution of the 1975 Covenant
In 1965, the United States established the Congress of
Micronesia to provide the trust territory with some degree of local
government, 2 and in 1966, the Congress of Micronesia petitioned
the President of the United States to open talks on future political
alternatives 63 for the TTPI. Negotiations finally commenced in
1969,64 but became effectively deadlocked by the end of 1972.65
In April, 1972, the leadership of the Marianas District had invited
the United States to participate in separate talks on the possibility
of determining a future political status for the Marianas as an
entity separate from the rest of Micronesia. In December, 1972,
the United States accepted, and separate negotiations began.66
Discussions continued for two years and bore fruit in the form of
,the Covenant released in February, 1975.
The preamble6 7 explains that the Covenant's purpose is:
[T]o establish a self-governing Commonwealth for the North-
ern Marianas Islands within the American Political System
and to define the future relationship between the Northern
Marianas Islands and the United States. This Covenant will
be mutually binding when it is approved by the United States
and the Marianas District Legislature and by the people of
61. See note 27, supra.
62. Department of Interior Order No. 2882, Sept. 28, 1964.
63. Blaz & Lee, The Cross of Micronesia, NAVAL WAR COL. REV., June, 1971,
at 59, 71 [hereinafter cited as Blaz & Lee].
64. Id. at 73.
65. The reason, according to U.S. Senator Pell:
Negotiations have thus far failed to produce a compromise acceptable
to both the United States and Micronesia, with American opposition to
Micronesia's demand for the option of eventual independence providing
the major stumbling block.
121 CONG. REc. 14863 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975). For a brief history of the
events leading up to the deadlock see Green, Termination of the U.S. Pacific Is-
lands Trusteeship, 9 TEXAS INT'L L.J. 175, 179-80 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Termination].
66. Id. at 181.
67. The text consists of a preamble, ten substantive articles, and a "technical
agreement" regarding leased land use.
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the Northern Marianas Islands in a plebiscite constituting
on their part a sovereign act of self-determination.68
The political relationship between the two peoples is defined
as one in which the Marianas will be "in political union with and
under the sovereignty of the United States of America." 9  This
means that:
The United States may enact legislation ... applicable to the
Northern Marianas Islands ... [but] agrees to limit the exer-
cise of that authority so that the fundamental provisions of
this Covenant . ..may be modified only [with the mutual
consent of both governments.]
70
Under the Covenant, certain financial 71 and citizenship 72 benefits
are extended to the islanders, while the United States is permitted
full control of Marianan foreign affairs73 and various land-use
privileges for strategic purposes.
74
B. Choosing the Participants
The parties to the 1975 Covenant are the United States and
the Northern Marianas Islands. The parties to the 1947 Agree-
ment were the United States and the United Nations, and its sub-
ject matter was the totality of Micronesia. There is no provision
within the 1975 Covenant for any participation by either Micro-
nesia generally, or by the United Nations. Moreover, such
participation seems to be expressly precluded by the language of
section 1002:
Any determination by the President [of the United States]
that the Trusteeship Agreement has been terminated or will
be terminated on a date certain will be final and will not be
subject to review by any authority, judicial or otherwise, of
the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, the Northern Mari-
anas Islands, or the United States.
68. There are no Southern Marianas. Guam is the southern-most island in
the Marianan chain, and is regarded by most Marianans as an integral part of
their "nation." The designation "Northern" is employed to avoid impliedly ex-
cluding Guam as one of the Marianas.
69. 1975 Covenant, supra note 3, § 101.
70. Id., § 105.
71. Id., art. VII.
72. Id., art. II.
73. Id., art. I.
74. Id., art. VIII.
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Under the terms of the 1947 Agreement, the United States
must be party to any modification of that treaty.75 But the United
Nations Charter 76 provides that the world body must also approve
any alteration or amendment to the terms of the trusteeship.77
Absence of actual United Nations participation in the establish-
ment of the Commonwealth does not condemn the new status as
invalid per se. However, while requisite United Nations approval
may be granted at any time, it must be granted at some time, and
the United States is powerless to avoid this requirement by only
unilateral declaration such as section 1002. The necessary con-
clusion is that the Covenant cannot alone effect legal termination of
the TTPI.
71
There is no strict requirement in either the 1947 Agreement
or the United Nations Charter that the territorial leadership be
included in the termination process. But it has been protested
that neither the 1947 Agreement nor any other legal doctrine per-
mits the Administering Authority, on its own initiative, to partition
a trust territory by entering into termination negotiations with one
of its factions.7" Moreover, the precedent of other trust termina-
75. 1947 Agreement, supra note 5, art. 15.
76. See note 27, supra.
77. U.N. CHARTER art. 79. The United States accepted this principle of mu-
tual consent at the drafting of the trust agreement. "[T]he United States would
see no harm at all in saying that alterations in the terms of trusteeship can only
be undertaken by agreement between the United States and the Security Council."
Trusteeship Debates, supra note 31, at 476. The U.S. even went out of its way
to stress how fundamental this principle was to the concept of trusteeship itself:
"[Tihe whole theory of the Trusteeship System is based on the fact that there
must be, in any case, at least two parties to any trusteeship agreement." Id. at
670. Since this is the prevailing view of trusteeship, it is difficult to imagine what
role the U.S. might have in mind for section 1002.
78. Termination is a modification of the terms of the 1947 Agreement, and
any such modification requires the mutual consent of the U.S. and the Security
Council. If the position of the U.S., as the sole party on one side of the bargain
and a veto-wielding fraction of the party on the other, would suggest the possibil-
ity of overreaching, any such fears turn out to be groundless. Logically, the veto
permits only forced rejection of an unfavorable agreement, a result which is avail-
able to the U.S. through the simple exercise of those powers granted by the 1947
Agreement. The veto cannot force the Security Council to adopt an unfavorable
measure. Moreover, the U.S. assured the Security Council that it could not "ad-
mit the idea of exercising the veto in the Security Council in a case where it would
appear to be acting in a dual capacity, sitting on both sides of the table.
Trusteeship Debates, supra note 31, at 665.
79. Traditionally, the Trusteeship Council of the U.N., to whom the Security
Council long ago delegated the bulk of its trusteeship-related duties, sends an an-
nual visiting mission to each trust territory for a general inspection. The report
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tions discourages this practice.80
C. The Criteria for Proper Termination:
Legal Deficiencies in both
Method and Result
A deficiency potentially more serious than the exclusion of
both the United Nations and Micronesia generally from negotia-
which followed the 1973 visit to Micronesia was critical of the U.S.-Marianan sep-
aratist talks which were just then getting underway. It sparked considerable com-
ment. See U.N. Doe. T/1741 (1973). "The U.N. Visiting Mission of 1973 pro-
tested that the 1947 trusteeship agreement gave no authority to the Marianas to
negotiate separately from the rest of the territory." 121 CONG. REC. 10798 (daily
ed. June 17, 1975). (Reported in Murray, New Outpost of Empire, 220 THE NA-
TION 459, 460 (1975)) [hereinafter cited as Murray].
"[A] report by the 1973 United Nations Visiting Mission to Micronesia
stated:
We wish to emphasize here, that although the Micronesians themselves
must work out for themselves what kind of future links they wish to have
with one another, the administration (U.S.) is still at this state obligated
to promote national unity in every way possible.
(Emphasis added.)" 121 CONG. REc. 10799 (daily ed. June 17, 1975) (letter
from Representative Rasa, Marianas Delegation, Congress of Micronesia, to Sena-
tor Hart, May 15, 1975.)
In a recent statement, Senator Gary Hart documented the views of several
Micronesian officials, indicating firm opposition to the U.S.-encouraged dismem-
berment of their fragile oceanic domain. One of the more telling views follows:
On September 24 the two elected Marianas delegates to the Micronesian
Constitutional Convention now in session telegraphed their views. These
men said, "We recognize the Congress of Micronesia as the sole negoti-
ator for all six districts, Marianas included, and strongly believe inten-
tions to separate any district from the Micronesian majority is legally
and morally wrong."
Statement of Senator Gary W. Hart, Hearings on S3. Res. 107 Before the Senate
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. at - (1975).
This view would seem to be supported by the words of the 1960 Declaration:
Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity
and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
1960 Declaration, supra note 51, para. 6.
For a discussion of the international legal issues attending separation, see
Termination, supra note 65, at 192-204; Note, A Macrostudy of Micronesia: The
Ending of a Trusteeship, 18 N.Y.L.F. 139, 176-77 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Macrostudy].
80. Separation issues were raised in conjunction with the termination of two
other trust territories. In the case of Togoland, it was pointed out that article
76(b) of the U.N. Charter speaks of the "freely expressed wishes of the peoples,"
but the General Assembly refused to construe this as granting the right of self-
determination to sub-groups. U.N. Trusteeship C. Res. 1496, 18 U.N. Trustee-
ship, Supp. 1, at 2, Annex 12 U.N. Doc. T/1276 at 2 (1956) (emphasis added).
The Cameroons on the other hand were permitted to separate, but only after
the issue had been dealt with in a territory-wide referendum. G.A. Res. 1350,
13 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/4090, Add. 1 at 1 (1959).
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tions leading to the 1975 Covenant is the failure of the Covenant
to meet the criteria for proper termination mandated by United
Nations resolution.
The Charter of the United Nations, the 1947 Agreement, the
1960 Declaration and Resolution 1541 all proclaim, in effect, that
one of the duties of the administering nation is to:
[P]romote the development of the inhabitants of the Trust
Territory towards self-government or independence as may
be appropriate to the . . . freely expressed wishes of the
people .... "I
These two conditions, "self-government" and "free-expression",
are the recurring criteria which identify a dependent status such
as trusteeship as having been terminated. However, it is not
immediately apparent whether both conditions must be met, or
whether the satisfaction of either would be adequate. The ques-
tion is important because the two conditions are mutually inde-
pendent. For example, a people emerging from trusteeship might
express their wishes for a political status which the contracting par-
ties would refuse to accept as either self-governing or independ-
ent. On the other hand, the contracting parties might endorse
a status as satisfactory to them, but which turns out to be in conflict
with the wishes of the people.
Resolution 1541, in positive and direct language, construes
both these conditions as necessary. 2  Firstly, "self-government"
81. 1947 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 6, para. 1. See also, U.N. CHARTER
art. 76, para. b; 1960 Declaration, supra note 51, para. 5; Resolution 1541, supra
note 54, Prin. II.
82. This was the expressed intent of the Resolution's authors. The final
draft had been proposed by committee chairman Jha, of India. In explaining his
subsequently accepted notion of "free-expression" he said:
[Any arrangement whereby a dependency selects a status other than
complete independence] should take place between countries which have
attained a relatively advanced stage of self-government, which presup-
poses capacity to make a responsible and intelligent choice ....
U.N. Doc. A/AC.100/L.1, at 6, para. 24(a) (1960) [hereinafter cited as Resolu-
tion Debates].
Mr. Jha's understanding of "free-association" was also narrowly drawn:
[The strong presumption that dependent territories should accede to in-
dependence] did not preclude a territory from seeking a free association,
as a distinct entity, with an independent State, and from voluntarily sur-
rendering certain aspects of sovereignty in accordance with the wishes
of its people, while retaining the right at any time to reconsider its de-
cision and to choose independence.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.100/SR.3 at 5 (1960) (emphasis added).
On the subject of absorption, Mr. Cuevas Cancino, of Mexico said: "The
union of a territory with an independent country to form an inter-continental State
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must occur in one of only three possible forms:13 independence,"4
free-association or integration. 5 Secondly, any such status may
only be achieved through a process characterized by "free-expres-
sion." The resolution does not address the role of "free-expres-
sion" in relation to attaining independence, 6 but regarding the
other two permissible statuses it commands:
Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary
choice by the peoples of the territory concerned.
The integration should be the result of the freely expressed
wishes of the territory's peoples acting with full knowledge of
the change in their status .... 87
Clearly, a "satisfactory" status cannot be forced upon an unwilling
people, nor may an eager population freely adopt a non-complying
political environment.88
1. The June plebiscite and free-expression. A general pleb-
iscite was held in the Marianas in June, 1975, which endorsed
the 1975 Covenant by a remarkable seventy-eight percent vote.
had to be based on the principle of self-determination and full equality." Resolu-
tion Debates, supra at 5, para. 20. Mr. Jha expressed the same principle even
more forcefully by emphasizing that:
[I]n the case of integration-a decision which was irrevocable by the
territory concerned-the principle should be laid down that absolute
equality of fundamental rights between the peoples of both countries was
a sine qua non.
U.N. Doc. A/AC.100/SR.5 at 11 (1960).
From these discussions it becomes apparent that only a small number of nar-
rowly drawn statuses were considered as meeting the criteria for "full measure of
self-government":
(1) Independence (however achieved).
(2) Absorption, acquired through "free-expression", and occurring within a
context of absolute equality of right between the two peoples.
(3) Free-association, acquired through "free-expression", and requiring the
retention, by the dependent State, of the unilateral right to withdraw.
83. Resolution 1541, supra note 54, Prin. VI.
84. This status is expressed in Resolution 1541 as, "Emergence as a sover-
eign independent State." Id.
85. Integration with an independent State should be on the basis of
complete equality between the peoples of the erstwhile Non-Self-Govern-
ing Territory and those of the independent country with which it is inte-
grated.
Id. Prin. VIII.
86. The possibility of being coerced into freedom is apparently not regarded
as a critical threat to international fair play. There was no discussion of this
in the debates. See note 82, supra.
87. Resolution 1541, supra note 54, Prin. VII, para. a; Prin. IX, para. b.
88. Happily, the same conclusion arises from what was written, here, as
from what was said, during debate. See note 82, supra.
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Ninety-three percent of the eligible voters turned out.8 9 Such
statistics might be regarded as speaking for themselves, rendering
any discussion of the election's validity academic. Indeed, Presi-
dent Ford declared:
This historic act of self-determination was the capstone of
more than twenty years of continuous effort on the part of
the people of the Marianas District to enter into close union
with the United States.90
But Senator Gary Hart, reporting to the Senate on the results of
the June plebiscite, saw the stone as capping an effort of a
different sort:
The vote is the capstone of an administration effort extend-
ing over several years and designed to make those islands a
part of the United States and the islanders citizens. 91
The form of the plebiscite was straightforward. The ques-
tion appeared on the ballot as a simple "yes/no" alternative.92
A "yes" vote endorsed the 1975 Covenant, but a "no" vote did
more than register disagreement. The Covenant's failure would
mean the continuation of trusteeship; hence, a "no" vote was actu-
ally an endorsement of the trust status.
In essence, the people of the Marianas were being asked to
choose between commonwealth status, with some of the bene-
fits of U.S. citizenship, and continued trusteeship, with none
of the rights of free citizens. 93
Continued trusteeship was not considered a political possibil-
ity by any of the parties involved. The focus of the meetings
which the United States held with both Micronesia94 and the
89. 121 CONG. REC. 11427 (daily ed. June 24, 1975) (Senator Fong report-
ing on the results of the plebiscite).
90. Letter from President Gerald R. Ford to the Speaker of the House, and
the President of the Senate, July 1, 1975, 11 PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS: GERALD
R. FORD 695 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Presidential Letter].
91. 121 CONG. REC. 10796 (daily ed. June 17, 1975).
92. As local authorities across Micronesia began to agitate for eventual
independence, the United States singled out the more docile Marianas
for special treatment . . . and presented the islands' 15,000 residents
with a take-it-or-leave-it-choice.
121 CONG. REC. 14864 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975) (from N.Y. Times, June 29,
1975, § 4, at 14, col. 1.).
93. 121 CONG. REc. 10797 (daily ed. June 17, 1975) (from Miller, New Pa-
cific Outpost, PROGRESsIVE, June, 1975).
94. The first agenda proposed by the Congress of Micronesia for talks with
the U.S. on future political alternatives consisted of the three familiar alternatives
embodied in Resolution 1541: independence, free-association, and integration. By
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Marianas95 was the territory's political status after trusteeship.
Since the 1975 Covenant offered some political benefits beyond
trusteeship, its victory over the status quo should not be surprising.
However, the form of the plebiscite was essentially that of a "one
candidate election," and competitive proposals were not encour-
aged, nor even permitted. If the "free-expression" mandated by
Resolution 1541 is meant to guarantee more than a hollow right,
it must be construed to require not only popular selection of the
winning alternative, but also the guarantee that the alternatives
presented, fairly represent the range of local political disposition.
96
The June plebiscite failed to provide such a practical array of alter-
natives.9 7  One result of this is that the apparent success of the
1975 Covenant yields no information as to its probable success
if pitted against one or more reasonable alternatives.
American refusal to consider any post-trust status except one
proposed by the United States, and tailored to its own interests,
the time talks actually began, this had been narrowed to free-association. For
a discussion of these developments see Metelski, Micronesia and Free Associa-
tion: Can Federalism Save Them?, 5 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 162, 166-72 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Metelski]. See also Blaz & Lee, supra note 63, at 69-77.
95. The Commonwealth was the only political alternative to be considered
by the U.S.-Marianan negotiators. For a brief history of the discussions see Ter-
mination, supra note 65, at 180-83.
96. In fact, the dominant political concern in the Marianas for the last two
decades has been reunification with Guam, an island historically and geographic-
ally "part" of the Marianas. A concise history of Marianan efforts directed
towards reunification with Guam appears in a statement by Vincente N. Santos,
President of the Marianas Islands District Legislature, printed in 121 CoNG. REc.
12954 (daily ed. July 17, 1975). While absorption of the Marianas by Guam,
a voiceless United States possession, would undoubtedly run counter to the United
Nations understanding of acceptable post-trust status, nothing would block the in-
clusion of Guam in a future Marianan political status acceptable to all parties.
97. The plebiscite could have qualified as providing a practical selection had
it, for example, presented the islanders with a choice among the three U.N.-ap-
proved non-colonial statuses set forth in Resolution 1541. See note 82, supra.
One writer, commenting on the absence of the independence option noted:
The United States position would look a lot better if the alternatives
offered to the people of the Marianas were those put forth in Article
VI [of the 1947 Agreement, note 6 supra] and insisted on in that article.
[See note 81, supra, and accompanying text] ....
Plebiscites are almost always rigged in the way the question is
stated. Permitting only yes or no answers to the covenant makes the
manipulation clearer. It's not defensible, however, to do this when the
legal background so clearly requires something more.
Leibowitz, The Independence Option, The San Juan Star, Aug. 26, 1975, at 13,
col. 2. Mr. Liebowitz is the former general counsel of the U.S.-Puerto Rico Status
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had caused the collapse of negotiations with the Congress of
Micronesia. During the United States-Micronesian negotiations
the American representative was reported to have remarked to the
Micronesians, upon the United States' refusal to discuss the
independence option:
I should say again . . . that the circumstances which led
to the trust territory's designation as a strategic trust will con-
tinue to exist whatever your future status might be. I can-
not imagine, for instance, that my government would agree
to termination of the trusteeship on terms which would in
any way threaten the stability in the area and which in the
opinion of the United States [would] endanger international
peace and security.
98
Two and half years later, this same recalcitrance embodied in the
June plebiscite's abbreviated field of choice resulted in a proposed
future Marianan status which fell far short of the standard for
"free-expression" established by Resolution 1541-a standard
specifically designed to prevent such attempts at international
overreaching.
Over ninety percent of Micronesia's public revenues are
derived from United States' assistance,99 a circumstance which led
one writer to cast doubt on whether any plebiscite could qualify
as permitting "free-expression" if one of the options offers a con-
tinuation of large-scale United States aid.100 Another suggests
that the indirect strategic advantage of this dependent condition
did not come about in an entirely accidental way. 10
The "free-expression" anticipated by Resolution 1541 is the
freedom of a majority of a people to choose that status which best
98. Liebowitz, The Independence Option, San Juan Star, Aug. 26, 1975,
at 13, col. 2. See note 65, supra.
99. Metelski, supra note 94, at 171.
100. "That's nice;" quips the author, "the people of the Marianas, who have
become totally dependent on the U.S. defense establishment already, show good
taste in their selection of a patron country." Safire, A Destiny Not so Manifest,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1975, at 33, col. 1.
101. A secret study done under the Kennedy administration and follow-
ing the military's line of thought recommended that the United States as-
sure itself of future control of Micronesia by increasing Congressional
grants to the territory, educating the people in American ways and then
conducting a plebiscite while Micronesian appreciation of this generosity
was at a maximum.
Murray, supra note 79, at 459. "A Chamorran [the predominant ethnic group
in the Marianas] student observed . . . '[t]he Americans use dollars instead of
bullets, but the results are the same.'" Id. at 460.
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satisfies their political aspirations. This freedom is destroyed
where the field of choice is arbitrarily limited by some outside
agency, or where the non-political benefits of one alternative are
sufficiently overpowering to eclipse any differences in the political
value between the selections. The United Nations Charter
commands that the United States should promote in these islands
"progressive development towards self-government,"' 102 and that
"free-expression" should be an element of that process.' This
limited plebiscite cannot qualify as fulfilling the requirement that
any new status for a trust territory be arrived at through a process
of "free-expression." Adherence to this requirement would seem
all the more compelling where the international event in question is
the political coalescence of two peoples whose populations differ by
a ratio of more than ten-thousand to one,10 4 and which will result
in at least some measure of domination of the smaller by the
larger.
2. The new status and self-government. The manner and
context in which the June plebiscite was conducted strongly sug-
gests that the United States has failed in its obligations under inter-
national law.' The same judgment must fall on the nature of
the political relationship which the 1975 Covenant seeks to estab-
lish between the two peoples. 06
102. U.N. CsTTmR art. 76, para. b.
103. As construed by Resolution 1541. See note 54, supra.
104. There are somewhat fewer than 15,000 islanders. The current popula-
tion of the U.S. is approximately 220,000,000.
105. See note 27, supra.
106. The Covenant's defenders have claimed that the Marianan status will be
"like" the Puerto Rican Commonwealth. It is argued that U.N. acquiescence in
Puerto Rico's status should portend similar treatment for the Marianan Common-
wealth. Canham, Micronesia's Future, Chris. Sci. Monitor, July 14, 1975, at 27,
col. 1. While recognizing a similarity in political status, such an argument fails
to distinguish between the fundamentally different legal relationships enjoyed by
the United States with these two territories.
Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter provides substantial protection
to the status quo of a territory within the domestic jurisdiction of a nation. While
Puerto Rico falls within the domestic jurisdiction of the U.S., the Marianas do
not. Rather, the United States is in the position of a fiduciary to whom the Mari-
anas have been entrusted by the U.N. See 121 CONG. REc. 10796 (daily ed. June
17, 1975) (Senator Gary Hart refers to the United Nations as the body which
"owns" Micronesia). The "colonies" referred to by the 1960 Declaration are an-
other example of territories falling outside the domestic jurisdiction of an adminis-
tering nation. United Nations disinterest in a Puerto Rican status which does not
comply with Resolution 1541 cannot provide a convincing precedent for similar
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Resolution 1541 provides for termination by independence °7
or absorption, ' s neither of which are represented in this transac-
tion, or by a third alternative, "free-association."
Free-association should be the result of a free and voluntary
choice by the peoples .... [I]t should be one which ... re-
tains for the peoples of the territory which is associated with
an independent State the freedom to modify the status of that
territory through the expression of their will .... 109
The key phrase is "freedom to modify the status." In the place
of such unilateral power to alter the relationship, the 1975
Covenant requires mutual consent to change any of its fundamen-
tal provisions. 110 Should the Covenant be given international
effect, the result will be to lock the Marianas into the American
political system with no means of withdrawal in the absence of
United States approval. Such a relationship propagates the very
sort of dependence which Resolution 1541 seeks to eliminate."'
Moreover, as a safeguard to prevent establishment of such a rela-
tionship, the rule is laid down that a territory is not free to self-
determine its way into bondage. 2  The commonwealth status has
been attacked for this deficiency" 3 and for its similarities to
colonialism.
1 4
107. See note 84, supra.
108. See note 85, supra.
109. Resolution 1541, supra note 54, Prin. VII. The Cook Islands have been
in "free-association" with New Zealand since 1964 and retain the right to termi-
nate the relationship at will. Cook Islands Constitution Act of 1964, 13 Eliz. 2,
No. 69 § 41 (N.Z.) [reproduced in 2 A. PEASLEE, CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 944,
962 (3d rev. ed. 1966)].
110. 1975 Covenant, supra note 3, § 105.
111. Resolution 1541, supra note 54, Prin. I. The Resolution is quite clear
in its requirement that any non-independent status, to be classifiable as non-
colonial, must offer either complete equality or the opportunity to withdraw from
the relationship. See note 82, supra.
112. See note 82, supra, and accompanying text.
113. The proposed "commonwealth" charter could be modified only with
mutual consent of the United States and the Marianas, contrary to a
1960 U.N. resolution requiring that an associated state be free to modify
its status.
San Juan Star, July 10, 1975, at 8, col. I (comments of Jose Cabranes, former
Administrator of the Washington Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico).
114. "It seems to me that this is not the time for the United States to acquire
a new colony, even if the people of the Marianas [choose] colonialism over all
other status alternatives." Wash. Post, July 22, 1975, § A. at 18, col. 5 (from
a statement by Jose Cabranes).
"The extension of the American flag to additional areas in Asia inevitably
raises charges of colonialism and imperialism throughout the international corn-
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While the presence or absence of a "freedom to modify"
clause in the 1975 Covenant would have a radical impact on the
political status which results, the probability seems small that its
presence would have a material adverse effect on the interests of
the United States. Had the islanders been given the choice
between complete independence, and "free-association" in the
form of the existing Covenant but including the all-important uni-
lateral modification provision, it is hardly conceivable that the
Marianas would have chosen independence. A free-association
"bail-out" clause would insure that potential independence would
be permanently retained. However, the predominant message of
the last twenty years has been the Marianan desire. for closer ties
between their island domain and Guam, and hence, the United
States." 5 When this disposition is coupled with the islands' cur-
rent financial position of complete dependence on the United
States, and the absolute vulnerability of a mid-ocean nation of
15,000 souls, the possibility of escape from the federal fold seems
remote indeed.
Nevertheless, such a clause would raise the possibility of the
Marianas, at some point in the future, becoming fully independent
from the United States. Indeed, the United States has been
resolute in making it clear that there is no circumstance under
which it is prepared to relinquish ultimate control of any part of
Micronesia." 6 Negotiations between the United States and the
Congress of Micronesia failed when it became apparent that the
Micronesians were not prepared to accept a post-trust status,
demanded by the United States, which would maintain irrevocable
United States control over the territory's political future.'117 It is
not surprising to find that collapse of the Micronesian discussions,
which threatened to lead to a result unfavorable to the United
States, should coincide with the opening of the Marianan talks,
which promise a new political status providing for rather direct
United States control.
munity." 121 CONG. REC. 14864 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1975) (comments of Sena-
tor Pell). See also 121 CoNG. REC. 10796 (daily ed. June 17, 1975) (comments
of Senator Gary Hart).
115. See note 96, supra. But see Termination, supra note 65, at 180-82.
116. See note 65, supra; note 98, supra, and accompanying text.
117. In the wake of Micronesian charges that the United States has refused
to consider the possibility of independence as a post-trust alternative, (U.N. Doc.
T/PV. 1413, at 36, 37 (1973)), the U.S.-Micronesian discussions ground to a
halt in November, 1973. See also note 65, supra.
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That the success of the 1975 Covenant would further United
States strategic policy is not in doubt. But the only permitted
strategic purpose of trusteeship is to "further international peace
and security.""' 8  The United States would be hard put to justify
to the rest of the world that international peace is served by
American domination of the political future of this fourteen-island
archipelago off the coast of Asia. Even if the United States could
show such hegemony to be internationally relevant, current inter-
pretations of the United Nations Charter suggest that where
strategic concerns and humanitarian interests such as political
rights collide, the welfare of the inhabitants must prevail.
III. CONCLUSION
The current international legal position of the United States
in this controversy is at best precarious. The promotion of the
1975 Covenant cannot be squared with the United States' humani-
tarian obligations under the terms of the 1947 Agreement. Nor
is it persuasive to argue that these abridgements of the islanders'
rights are a necessary cost of fulfilling United States' strategic du-
ties. The more reasonable explanation is that the United States' de-
termination to maintain political control of the Marianas is without
legal foundation, and rests instead on the inertia of twenty years
of misunderstanding the nature of this trusteeship, a misunderstand-
ing plainly demonstrated in Secretary of State Marshall's reassur-
ance to the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
during the 1947 hearings, when the chairman asked whether:
.[U]nder the terms of the trusteeship agreement we have the
same freedom of action on behalf of national security as we
would have if we were continuing the administration of the
islands under our present exclusive control."19
But Marshall was wrong. When all the relevant international
law is evaluated, it is impossible to conclude that the 1947 Agree-
ment granted such unlimited freedom of action to the United
States. Moreover, the 1960 Declaration puts to rest any possibility
of a "prescriptive right" arising in one people to limit the sover-
eignty of another.120
118. This is the first of the basic objectives of trusteeship. U.N. CARrTE
art. 76, para. a.
119. See note 45, supra.
120. The Declaration proclaims the General Assembly to be: "[c]onvinced
that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of
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Under these circumstances, the gulf between duty and per-
formance is so wide that the United States should not expect, and
the United Nations should not extend, approval of the 1975
Covenant.
Should the United States continue in defiance of the United
Nations' position12' and persist in advocating the validity of this
new commonwealth, 22 the possible legal ramifications are varied.
The United Nations could choose to remain silent, 2 3 or to regard
the 1975 Covenant as a void attempt at termination effecting
neither the trusteeship nor the duties of the Administering
Authority.' 24 A third alternative is that the United Nations could
find the trusteeship terminated by violation of the "sacred trust"'25
to which the United States bound itself in accepting the TTPI.
This raises the question of whether the United Nations' interest
in a trust territory is sufficient to permit such action, and whether
their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory.... ".1960 Decla-
ration, supra note 51, preamble.
121. Such defiance is expressed in the 1975 Covenant itself: "Any determina-
tion by the President [of the United States] that the Trusteeship Agreement has
been terminated . . . will be final and will not be subject to review ... " 1975
Covenant, supra note 3, § 1002.
122. Such a position is expressed, for example, in Presidential Letter, supra
note 90, wherein President Ford greets the June plebiscite as an "historic act of
self-determination ... "
123. This is an unlikely possibility, in light of world interest being shown in
these events. For example, on November 30, 1975, the International League for
the Rights of Man, "an organization of Americans and Europeans dedicated to
to the protection of human rights . . . [with] United Nations consultative status,"
formally complained to the U.N. that the U.S. was violating its trusteeship by
seeking to "annex" the Marianas. The League contends:
(I) "mhe trusteeship agreement requires self-determination by all peo-
ple in the territory."
(2) "[Sleparation would make it 'difficult, if not impossible for the
other island groups to survive as a unit.'"
(3) The Covenant's "mutual consent" provision is in violation of "a
General Assembly resolution that an associated state should be
free by itself to modify its status."
(4) The I.C.J. has rejected the notion of unilateral termination. (Ad-
visory Opinion on International Status of South-West Africa, [1950]
I.C.J. 128).
N.Y. Times, Dec. 1, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
124. One commentator has noted:
At the minimum . . . [a plebiscite would have to offer] Micronesian in-
dependence as one of the choices. Only if the people of Micronesia ap-
prove a new arrangement with the United States in "a sovereign act of
self-determination" is there hope of approval by the United Nations.
Macrostudy, supra note 79, at 175 (footnotes omitted).
125. See note 15, supra.
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any United States interest in the territory would persist in the
absence of an internationally recognized trust relationship.
The question of title to a trust territory is not well settled,
but the weight of opinion,"' even in the United States,'2 7 is that
title remains with the United Nations during the life of the trustee-
ship. In 1966, the United Nations found that its interest in South-
West Africa, which had been mandated to South Africa by the
League of Nations in 1920, was sufficient to support the demand
that South Africa vacate forthwith, "[for having] failed to fulfill
its obligations in respect of the administration of the Mandated
Territory .. .2" It is not unthinkable that the same treatment
could befall the United States if it were to fail in some important
duty, as perhaps the duty to promote the political development
of the inhabitants toward one of the three permitted statuses.
In the eyes of international law, America's only interest in
Micronesia is that of trustee. Termination of the trust extin-
guishes all rights enjoyed by the United States which flow from
the 1947 Agreement. Should the United Nations find the trust
vacated by the United States' failure to meet its obligations, any
continued American political presence would be an international
tresspass, subject to condemnation as simple colonialism.
The TTPI is the lone remaining international orphan of
World War 11.129 The United States must terminate this trust, but
only within the rules established by the international community-
rules by which it is bound under treaty and international law.
Peter Bergsman
126. [We have accepted a mandate as a sacred trust, not as part of our
sovereign territory. The mandate does not belong to my country or any
other country. It is held in trust for the world.
Statement of Committee Chairman Frazer, representative of New Zealand, during
Charter Debates, supra note 19, at 701.
127. Senator SMITH. [FIrom the standpoint of title . .. the title to
these islands would be in the United Nations as successor to the League
of Nations; as, being appointed the trustee, the United States takes over
the responsibility of the old conception of mandatory power that the Japs
had after the German war, which they so badly abused.
Secretary MARSHALL. Yes, sir.
1947 Hearings, supra note 5, at 8.
128. G.A. Res. 2145, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 2, Annexes, Agenda Item
No. 65, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
129. Papua, New Guinea became fully independent from its Administering
Authority, Australia, in September, 1975. TIME, Sept. 29, 1975, at 45.
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